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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the role of both ECB’s asset purchases and market sentiment in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
context. We explain the evolution of long-term interest rates in the Eurozone and in some Member States since the 
ECB started to purchase various securities for monetary policy purposes. We control for four categories of 
fundamentals: macroeconomic, international, financial and expectations. We show that unconventional monetary 
policies and country-specific market sentiment have significant negative and positive effects respectively. Our results 
suggest that ECB’s unconventional policies have been effective in mitigating the disruption in the channels of 
transmission across the different Eurozone countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the role of market sentiment and European Central 
Bank (ECB)’s policy of asset purchases on sovereign yields in the Eurozone and in 4 
Eurozone countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain). Since 2007, the ECB implemented a 
range of monetary policy decisions to deal with the multiple dimensions of the crisis. Some 
of those measures have been considered as unconventional as they went beyond cutting 
down the short-term policy rate and providing liquidity at a short-term maturity to the 
banking system. The ECB changed the conditions and the maturity of liquidity operations 
and proceeded to purchases of different classes of financial assets. The APP (assets purchase 
programme) implemented since March 2015 is the most recent example of unconventional 
measure, which is close to what was done earlier by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England.1 Empirical evidence on unconventional measures has suggested that they have 
been effective at reducing long-term interest rate in the United States and the United 
Kingdom either through the signalling or the portfolio balance channels.2 
 
In contrast, several measures implemented by the ECB were designed to address the specific 
features of the crisis in the Eurozone and of its institutions (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 
2012). Not only was the Eurozone confronted to a banking crisis in 2007-2008 but it also faced 
a sovereign debt crisis which started with the Greek episode in 2010 and resulted in a sharp 
increase of sovereign yields in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, thus impairing the 
transmission of the common monetary policy in peripheral countries.3 According to De 
Grauwe and Ji (2012 and 2013), the rise in the sovereign spreads against Germany is hardly 
explained by fundamentals. Consequently, they argue that the bulk of the rise can be 
attributed to a change in market sentiment. They emphasize the intrinsic fragility of the 
Euro, a currency without a sovereign, and of the Eurozone where national government issue 
debt in a currency over which they do not have perfect control, exposing them to an acute 
risk of self-fulfilling liquidity crisis driven by market sentiment. The outbreak of the Greek 
crisis would have triggered contagion effects on other Eurozone countries via sovereign 
yields (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012).  
 
This situation caused the launch of the Securities market programme (SMP) in May 2010, 
under which the ECB started purchasing Treasury securities from crisis countries. Contrary 
to the assets’ purchases in the United States and in the United Kingdom during the same 
period, the main objective of the SMP was not primarily monetary easing but most and 
foremost to improve its transmission across Eurozone countries and therefore implicitly to 
thwart the forces of market sentiment.4 Several other measures followed and notably the 
OMT (Outright monetary transaction) announced in August 2012.5 Before that in December 
2011 and March 2012, the VLTRO (Very long-term refinancing operation) provided liquidity 
to the banking system at a 3-year maturity. It enabled to secure access funding to the banking 
                                                     
1 The APP actually includes all purchase programmes implemented since September 2014. It started with the 
third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) and the ABSPP (Asset-backed purchase programme) and was 
then followed by PSPP (Public sector purchase programme) and CSPP (Corporate sector purchase programme). It 
must also be reminded that the Bank of England relaunched its assets purchase programme in August 2016 after 
the vote for the Brexit. 
2 An exhaustive list of contributions can be found in Borio and Zabai (2016). Early evidence for the US and the UK 
was notably provided by Joyce et al. (2011), Wright (2012) and Christensen and Rudebusch (2012). For the euro 
area, the impact of the asset purchase programme launched by the ECB is assessed by De Santis (2016). 
3 See Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) for a detailed analysis of the Greek crisis and its different stages.  
4 Assets purchases implemented with the APP aimed at making monetary policy stance more accommodative. 
5 Technical details of the OMT were provided one month later. 
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system. The VLTRO aimed at avoiding a systemic liquidity crisis but also at breaking the 
vicious feedback loop between the banking and sovereign debt crises.6 Consequently, most 
of the measures undertaken by the ECB during the crisis were expected not only to have an 
impact on long-term interest rate but also to mitigate fragmentation across the domestic 
government bond markets. Asset purchases were expected to have differentiated effects 
across sovereign assets in the Eurozone: stronger for peripheral countries than for core 
countries. Furthermore, another difference with US and UK monetary policies is 
institutional. Within the Public sector purchase programme (PSPP), the ECB buys different 
domestic sovereign bonds whereas the Federal Reserve purchased a set of homogenous 
assets, Treasuries or Mortgage-Backed Securities. The transmission channels of ECB’s 
policies are specific in this regard. 
 
Thus, we estimate the aggregated and country-specific impacts of the unconventional 
measures implemented by the ECB and of market sentiment on sovereign yields. We expect 
the impacts to be stronger in Spain and Italy while being less (or not) significant in Germany. 
The French case may be less clear-cut as France was not considered as a peripheral country 
but however experienced a moderate increase of its spread against German Bunds. 
 
The paper is related to the literature in several respects. The impact of the SMP was analysed 
by Gibson et al. (2016) based on panel estimations on a sample of Eurozone countries. They 
use confidential data from the ECB on the breakdown amount of sovereign bonds for 
countries that were concerned by the programme (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and 
Italy). The impact on spreads, after controlling for fundamentals, ranges between 126 and 
197 basis points in Spain, and between 292 and 456 basis points in Italy. Ghysels et al. (2016) 
find similar impacts on Spanish and Italian sovereign yields estimating a VAR model at 
intra-daily frequencies. Eser and Schwab (2016) report a significant but smaller impact of the 
SMP on the daily changes of sovereign yields. Altavilla et al. (2014) and Szczerbowicz (2015) 
resort to an event-study approach to estimate the impact of the different measures 
implemented by the ECB on the day of their announcement. Whereas Altavilla et al. (2014) 
only focus on the OMT, the analysis provided by Szczerbowicz (2015) encompasses all 
measures undertaken from 2008 to September 2012. It notably includes: the fixed-rate/full-
allotment, the SMP, the OMT, the VLTRO, the CBPP (Covered bond purchase programme) 
and the decline of the deposit rate at 0 %. Both studies find stronger results in crisis 
countries. Although the APP has been implemented only recently, De Santis (2016) argues 
that the APP has been expected since the summer 2014 and finds that most of the impact 
took place before its announcement and implementation.  
 
The role of market sentiment has been extensively documented by De Grauwe and Ji (2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015) and Favero and Missale (2012). De Grauwe and Ji (2012) emphasize 
significant mispricing in sovereign spreads during the crisis in a model accounting for 
fundamentals – current account to GDP ratio, debt to GDP ratio and real effective exchange 
rate – only. The unexplained component vanishes when they introduce a common time 
dummy variable, capturing market sentiments, in the estimations. Favero and Missale (2012) 
contrast market sentiment with fiscal fundamentals and advocate the development of 
Eurobonds when markets are “irrational”. Finally, Afonso et al. (2014) and Kinateder and 
Wagner (2017) show that the contagion effect explains sovereign spreads in the Eurozone. 
                                                     
6 From the outbreak of the crisis the ECB was concerned with the situation of the banking system. The maturity of 
long-term refinancing operations had already been extended to 6 months and 1 year. The ECB also purchased 
covered bonds through the CBPP (Covered-bond purchase programme) to ease funding access and costs for 
banks. 
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The contribution of this paper is to estimate a model of interest rate determination to assess 
simultaneously the role of market sentiment and the impact of all asset purchase programmes 
implemented by the ECB. Contrary to the existing literature, we do not consider these 
unconventional measures separately but resort to an overall assessment of their effect. To 
that end, monetary policy is measured by the variable “Securities held for monetary policy 
purpose” (SHMPP) and market sentiment by the “Composite indicator of systemic risk” (CISS) 
computed by the ECB for the Eurozone as a whole and for individual countries. The 
equations for interest rate determination are estimated for the Eurozone sovereign yield, the 
German, French, Italian and Spanish sovereign yields and for the Eurozone corporate sector 
yield. Estimating interest rate equations country by country, we can assess whether the 
impact of unconventional measures is different across countries after we have accounted for 
a (possible) country-specific effect of the market sentiment. 
 
Moreover, it is important to circumvent the endogeneity response of the monetary policy 
process and of market sentiment to sovereign yield dynamics. For instance, the transactions 
carried out by the ECB under the SMP were directly related to the tensions on sovereign 
markets. Greek, Portuguese and Irish bonds were initially concerned from May 2010 until 
the beginning of 2011 during the first stage of the SMP.7 The programme was then 
relaunched in August 2011 and primarily involved Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish 
bonds. Standard OLS estimates would be biased and capture the positive correlation 
between SMP transactions and sovereign yields instead of the causal impact that we expect 
to be negative in theory.  
 
Ghysels et al. (2016) address the endogeneity issue by looking at the intra-daily response – at 
a 15-min frequency – of the sovereign yield. Eser and Schwab (2016) argue that a panel 
estimation may reduce the problem if it accounts for common factors proxying tensions on 
sovereigns. In contrast, we correct the potential endogeneity bias of monetary policy by 
removing the contribution of the market sentiment and of Eurozone aggregate and country-
specific sovereign yields. In parallel, we account for the endogeneity of each country-specific 
systemic risk indicator by removing the contribution of asset purchases and of a global 
financial stress indicator (the VIX). Stated differently, we isolate the exogenous innovations 
to unconventional monetary policies and risk respectively.  
 
The main result of the paper is that innovations to unconventional monetary policies have 
contributed to lower long-term interest rates overall and in all countries, suggesting that they 
may have mitigated the disruption in the transmission of ECB policy across domestic 
financial markets. Besides, innovations to indicators of financial stress have positively 
impacted long-term interest rates in France and Spain only.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the usual 
determinants of interest rates. Section 3 presents the identification strategy to deal with the 
endogeneity bias. Estimates are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
  
                                                     
7 See Figure 1 in Eser and Schwab (2016). 
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2. The framework 
 
2.1. Theoretical background on interest rate determination 
 
There has long been an opposition between the loanable funds theory and the liquidity 
preference theory to govern the interest rate. According to the former, the interest rate is set 
at the balance between domestic savings and investment whereas according to the latter, it is 
set at the balance between money supply and money demand. The loanable funds theory 
highlights the incidence of the structural environment on interest rates – those variables 
which influence either savings, like demography, or investment, like the future yields on 
capital- whereas the liquidity preference theory highlights that of monetary policy and short 
run output (following the well-known LM curve). 
 
The usual distinction between both theories has long been related to the time dimension of 
the interest rate: the loanable funds theory applies to the long-term interest rate whereas the 
liquidity preference theory applies to the short-term interest rate. The distinction has 
therefore led to the complete separation of both interest rates and to the conclusion that 
monetary policy, via the setting of the short-term interest rate, would have no impact on 
long-term interest rates. 
 
This separation vanishes if the term structure of the interest rate is being introduced. This 
theory suggests that the long-term interest rate is driven by two key factors: expectations of 
future short-term rates and the term premium. Under the (perfect) Expectations hypothesis, 
the long-term interest rate would be a sequence of expected short-term rates. Consequently, 
current monetary policy decisions would influence the long-term interest rates inasmuch as 
they change expectations about the future stance of short-term decisions. Unconventional 
measures signal that the monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for a prolonged 
period of time and thus reduce future short term interest rates. The expectations / signalling 
channel is yet not the only transmission channel for unconventional measures. According to 
the preferred-habitat theory, investors are willing to hold securities of certain maturities. 
Consequently, assets’ purchases from the central bank modify the quantity of assets 
available to the private sector and modify the term premium component of assets price. 
Markets for bonds are supposed to be segmented by maturities and a change in quantities 
triggers a portfolio effect which leads to a price adjustment. Via this channel, corporate 
yields could also be influenced by central banks’ asset purchases as investors seek for 
substitutes to rebalance their portfolio. 
 
Drawing on these theories – loanable funds, liquidity preference and term structure of the 
interest rate -, it appears that the determinants of long-term interest rates can be separated 
into two parts: a macroeconomic part which illustrates the savings-investment nexus and 
includes current monetary policy and a part dedicated to the expectations of future 
monetary policies. 
  
The era of globalization, which accelerated in the 1980s has added two new groups of 
determinants to long-term interest rates: highly opened economies have increased the 
interactions between foreign and domestic interest rates; they have also led to growing 
liquidity and many more opportunities of arbitrage between financial markets, between 
currencies and between maturities. Globalization has then impinged on long-term interest 
rates via exchange rate variations and intensified their sensitiveness to global shocks. 
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Finally, these factors related to the domestic fundamentals, monetary policy and external 
factors may not fully account for the dynamics of interest rates. It remains an unexplained 
component or mispricing resulting from market sentiment or animal spirits. Globalization has 
probably made long-term interest rates more sensitive to financialization and to financial 
market sentiment. 
 
In what follows, we propose to estimate a model for long-term interest rates embracing these 
determinants and accounting for the impact of ECB asset purchases and for the impact of 
market sentiment. 
 
2.2. The equation for long-term interest rates 
 
We start from a simple model accounting for the determination of long-term interest rates for 
6 long-term interest-rates: the 10-year sovereign long-term interest rates for the Eurozone, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and an index of Eurozone corporate interest rates. As we 
aim at assessing the role of exceptional monetary policy measures and the role of market 
sentiment which arises during the recent global crisis, the sample starts in July 2009 and ends 
in February 2017. Data frequency is monthly. The starting point for the estimations is related 
to the beginning of the covered bond purchase programme (CBPP). 
 
To that end, we use the following equation where 𝑖𝑚,𝑡 is the long-term interest rate for a 
market (m) at time (t): 
 
𝑖𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛽′0 + 𝛽′1 𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽′2 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽′3 𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽′4 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽′5𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽′6𝑐𝑎𝑚,𝑡 
+ 𝛽′7 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽′8 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽′9 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽′10 𝑖𝑢𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽′11 𝑠𝑝𝑓_𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′12 𝑠𝑝𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑚,𝑡       (1) 
 
where the principal variables of interest are SHMPP (Securities held for monetary policy 
purpose) and CISS (Composite indicator of systemic risk). The expected signs of 𝛽′1 and 𝛽′2 are 
negative and positive respectively indicating that asset purchases from the ECB have 
contributed to reducing long-term interest rate whereas bond yields have been positively 
correlated with systemic indicator reflecting market sentiment. The absolute values of 𝛽′1 
and 𝛽′2 are also expected to be higher for Italy and Spain than for France and Germany. 
Equation (1) also includes four categories of fundamentals (macroeconomic, international, 
financial and expectations). Table A in the appendix describes data and their sources, while 
Figure A plots their evolution over our sample. 
 
The indicator of monetary policy (shmpp) includes all the asset purchase programmes 
implemented by the ECB since July 2009: SMP, CBPP1, CBPP2, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP and 
CSPP listed in the item 7.1 of the ECB’s weekly financial statements.8 SMP, CBPP1 and 
CBPP2 are terminated but securities purchased within these programmes will be held to 
maturity, so that the outstanding amount of assets held in the ECB balance sheet is still 
positive (above €111 billion on the 23rd of June 2017). The CISS is based on a set of measures 
of the financial stress for 5 segments of financial system, namely the financial intermediaries 
sector, money markets, equity markets, bond markets and foreign exchange markets. The 
systemic dimension of the indicator stems from higher weight put on situation in which the 
stress prevails in several segments of the market at the same time.9 It is noticeable that 
national measures of systemic risk are only based on the bond market. 
                                                     
8 A full description of the programmes is available from the ECB website. 
See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. 
9 See Hollo et al. (2012) for details. 
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For the set of controls, we first include macroeconomic variables. The industrial production 
(ipi) and the inflation rate (cpi) capture fundamentals linked to the macroeconomic outlook 
of the Eurozone and of Eurozone countries while macroeconomic risk will be captured by 
public debt and the current account.10 Second, long-term interest rates may be influenced by 
international factors. Effective exchange rates (eer) and oil prices are thus taken into account. 
We also include the US 10-year sovereign interest rate (ius) to capture spillovers stemming 
from the US money and financial markets. Third, financial risks can explain the long-term 
interest rates. As is standard now, international risk is measured by the US volatility index 
(VIX).11 Fourth, the influence of expectations is represented by two variables, the forecast of 
inflation (spf_cpi_2y) and the forecast of GDP growth (spf_gdp_2y) both at a 2-year horizon. 
These variables are released in the Survey of professional forecasters published by the ECB. 
They may influence long-term interest rates through their information content on the future 
economic environment and on future monetary policy. 
 
3. The identification issue 
 
Because long-term interest rates, the CISS and the asset purchase programmes are likely to 
be endogenous to each other, the estimation of the 𝛽′1 and 𝛽′2 parameters in equation (1) is 
likely to be biased. Some of the asset purchase programmes were implemented because of 
financial stress in the Eurozone and because of the surge in sovereign spreads. As the CISS 
captures the risk of self-fulfilling liquidity crisis, it may be influenced by monetary policy 
decisions. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) point to the intrinsic fragility of the European monetary 
union and the ability of central banks – through liquidity provisions – to mitigate market 
sentiment. To overcome the endogeneity issue, we perform two first-stage regressions to 
remove the contribution of the endogenous factors that underlies the evolution of these two 
variables and isolate the exogenous innovations to shmppt and cissm,t. 
 
Starting with the identification of the exogenous component of shmppt, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 
𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑧,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 𝑖𝑒𝑧,𝑡−1 
+𝛼3 𝑖𝑓𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4 𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 𝑖𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6 𝑖𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝,𝑡         (2) 
 
We assume that changes in shmppt are driven by the lagged value of the Eurozone CISS 
(cissez,t−1) and by lagged values of long-term interest rates of the Eurozone aggregate index 
and of individual countries. 
 
We identify exogenous shocks to cissm,t by removing the contribution of the 
contemporaneous value of the SHMPP and of the lagged value of a global financial stress 
indicator (the VIX) from the dynamics of the CISS. Thus, we have: 
 
𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑚,𝑡              (3) 
 
Therefore, the timing of the variables enables implicitly exogenous shocks to shmppt to 
impact contemporaneously the CISS and long-term interest rates while an exogenous shock 
to the CISS would impact contemporaneously the long-term interest rates and the SHMPP 
with a lag. This is consistent with the fact that the central bank decision-making process is 
                                                     
10 See Bernoth and Erdogan (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2014), and Favero and Missale (2012). 
11 See Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2014) for example. 
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not instantaneous and the response of policymakers to shocks to financial stress occurs with 
a lag whereas financial markets react more rapidly to monetary policy shocks. 
 
Equation (1) is therefore modified to avoid endogeneity bias and is estimated as follows: 
 
𝑖𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑎𝑚,𝑡 
+ 𝛽7 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑖𝑢𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑠𝑝𝑓_𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝑠𝑝𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡   (4) 
 
Equation (4) is estimated with OLS. Because our dependent variables are financial market 
variables that are likely to introduce heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we compute 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors assuming that 
the autocorrelation dies out after three lags.12 The sign of the β1 and β2 parameters should 
shed light on our question. In addition, we compute the variance contribution of 𝜖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑝𝑝,𝑡 and 
𝜖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑚,𝑡 using partial R² that indicates the fraction of the improvement in R² that is 
contributed by the excluded covariate.  
 
4. The role of monetary policy and market sentiment 
 
4.1. Baseline results 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the 6 baseline estimations. First, the R² suggests that 
fundamentals together with innovations to the CISS and SHMPP explain most of the 
variance of long-term interest rates in all specifications. 
 
Second, unconventional monetary policies have a significant and negative impact on all 
long-term interest rates but corporate long-term interest rates. The lack of impact may be 
explained by the fact that the bulk of the ECB’s asset purchases consists in sovereign assets. 
In June 2017, ECB holdings of corporate securities amounted to €95 billion whereas holdings 
of sovereigns under the PSPP reached €1,604 billion.13 The corporate sector purchase 
programme has been implemented since June 2016 and includes only high-graded corporate 
bonds. Consequently, it may be too early to identify a positive impact of unconventional 
policies on corporate bond yields. However, it might have been contemplated that other 
asset purchase programmes would have triggered a negative effect on corporate bond yields 
due to the portfolio rebalancing channel.14 Investors would seek close substitutes for 
sovereign bonds. Our results suggest that it did not happen for high yield corporate assets in 
the Eurozone. 
 
Third, we find that the negative impact of monetary policy has been differentiated among 
the 4 main Eurozone countries. The highest coefficient is observed for Spain and the lowest 
for the German sovereign yield. The negative effect for Italy is weaker than for Spain and 
close to the effect estimated for France. Altavilla et al. (2014) and Szczerbowicz (2015) obtain 
similar findings for the OMT and the SMP respectively. These results are consistent with the 
objective of the SMP and to a lesser extent with the PSPP, which aim to alleviate the burden 
of public debt for crises countries like Spain. Szczerbowicz (2015) also find a slightly lower 
                                                     
12 This correction also enables to circumvent the “generated regressor” bias that our explanatory variables of 
interest (innovations to asset purchases and CISS) might introduce in the estimation of standard errors. 
13 Holdings of sovereign securities are even higher if we account for securities purchased in the context of the 
SMP which amounted to € 98 billion in June 2017. 
14 See Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), Wright (2012) or Rogers et al. (2014) for evidence on the US and UK. 
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impact of the SMP for Italy.15 The negative and significant impact of innovations to SHMPP 
on German sovereign yield suggests that Germany has also benefited from the 
unconventional measures implemented by the ECB. The transmission channel may stem 
from the PSPP specifically as the breakdown of purchases has been set according to the share 
of Eurozone countries in the capital of the ECB with Germany having the largest. 
 
Fourth, risks measured with the CISS have the expected positive impact on bond yields 
though it is less systematically significant. The highest impact is for the Spanish sovereign 
bonds. The CISS is also significantly positive for France but not for Italy and Germany. 
However, we find that the impact of the VIX, measuring global risk, is higher, and 
significant, for Italy. It suggests that Italian sovereign yields have been more sensitive to 
global risk than to country-specific systemic risk. 
 
Fifth, analysing the variance decomposition of bond yields, our findings suggest that the 
contribution of innovations to SHMPP is stronger than the contribution of innovations to the 
CISS, except for Spain where the two contributions are very close (Table 1). 
 
Turning to the effects of control variables, the estimations generally suggest a positive 
relationship between long-term interest rates and inflation or expected inflation. A rise in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio increases sovereign yields for all countries but France. The impacts are 
only slightly significant (at the 10% level). The impact is significantly negative for the 
corporate bond yield, suggesting a crowding-in effect. The link between the effective 
exchange rate and the long-term interest rate is negative for all countries but France 
indicating that an appreciation is associated with a reduction in the interest rates.16 Our 
estimates confirm that current account imbalances since 2009 have a significant impact in 
Germany, France and Spain. An improvement in the current account balance reduces the 
sovereign yield. The impact of the industrial production is counterintuitive but expected 
GDP growth has a significant positive impact. 
 
Finally, international spillovers from the US Treasury securities market are also significant. A 
rise in the US 10-year interest rate is positively correlated with all European long-term 
interest rates and especially with the German bond rate. More generally, the correlation is 
larger in the core countries than in the periphery and not significant for the Eurozone 
corporate bond market.  
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
 
As mentioned above the dependent variables are determined by financial market variables 
and are likely to exhibit heteroscedasticity. We propose to estimate equation (4) with an 
ARCH model. Results are presented in table B in the Appendix and are mostly in line with 
the baseline results. The impact of SHMPP is lower than in the baseline but remains 
significant for all markets but German sovereign bond and corporate sector bond. The 
strongest effect is still identified for Spain. For the CISS, it is significant for Spain and France 
only. For control variables, we also find similar results overall. 
 
                                                     
15 There is no significant impact of the SMP for France, which is not surprising as French sovereign bonds were 
not concerned by this programme. 
16 De Grauwe and Ji (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) find contrasting results for this variable. The negative link 
between the real effective exchange rate and the long term interest rate may stem from capital inflows which 
would appreciate the currency. Capital flows would ease long-term interest rates.  
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Finally, we also assess the robustness of our results over a longer sample, starting in January 
1999. For these estimations, we introduce the EONIA rate to account for the effect of 
standard monetary policy (see table C in the Appendix). Here again, the effect of the two 
variable of interest is still significant. The relative impact of innovations to SHMPP is even 
more striking with the highest effect for Spain followed by Italy, France and Germany. The 
same holds for the impact of innovations to CISS indicating that higher country-specific risk 
increases sovereign yields. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper aims at assessing the impact of asset purchases from the ECB in the sovereign 
crisis context. To that end, we estimate an equation for long-term interest rates controlling 
for four categories of fundamentals: macroeconomic, international, financial and 
expectations. Our results suggest that innovations to unconventional policies, measured by 
Securities held for monetary policy purpose, and country-specific systemic risk, measured by the 
innovations to the Composite indicator of systemic risk, have significant negative and positive 
effects on sovereigns yields respectively. Besides, not only did assets purchase succeed in 
reducing all sovereign yields in the Eurozone but it also had a differentiated impact as the 
effect was stronger for Spain and to a lesser extent for Italy than for France and Germany. 
Consequently, the measures implemented by the ECB were also effective at mitigating the 
disruption created by the sovereign debt crisis in the transmission of monetary policy across 
Eurozone countries. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EZ_s10y DE_s10y FR_s10y IT_s10y ES_s10y EZ_c10y
ϵSHMPP -0.154** -0.137* -0.222*** -0.241** -0.431*** -0.058
[0.06] [0.08] [0.06] [0.12] [0.10] [0.18]
ϵCISS_m 0.056 0.015 0.145*** 0.181 0.462*** 0.132
[0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.16] [0.16] [0.23]
IPI_m -0.237*** -0.092** -0.171*** -0.175*** -0.297*** -0.980***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.11] [0.12]
CPI_m 0.372*** -0.046 0.282*** 1.020*** 0.087 0.762**
[0.13] [0.08] [0.07] [0.20] [0.20] [0.34]
Debt_m 0.154* 0.123* -0.159* 0.364* 0.503** -1.221***
[0.08] [0.06] [0.09] [0.19] [0.23] [0.22]
CA_m -0.281*** -0.037 -0.03 0.005 -0.223** 0.132
[0.10] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.11] [0.23]
EER -0.065 -0.082** -0.012 0.086 -0.237** -0.280**
[0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.09] [0.11] [0.13]
Oil -0.002 0.053** -0.014 0.018 0.039 0.055
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
VIX 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.107** 0.276*** 0.154* 0.836***
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.08] [0.09] [0.12]
US_s10y 0.569*** 0.797*** 0.634*** 0.603*** 0.536*** 0.258
[0.07] [0.03] [0.08] [0.13] [0.14] [0.16]
SPF_CPI_2y 0.349*** 0.433*** 0.299*** 0.348** 1.164*** 0.151
[0.12] [0.08] [0.09] [0.17] [0.20] [0.34]
SPF_GDP_2y -0.089* -0.041 -0.031 -0.261*** -0.177** 0.012
[0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.07] [0.10]
constant 2.445*** 1.589*** 2.107*** 3.597*** 3.694*** 6.554***
[0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.08] [0.10]
N 89 89 89 89 89 89
R² 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.95
ϵSHMPP 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.00
ϵCISS_m 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.01
Table 1 - The determination of long-term interest rates
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) for a
given market m  (EZ, FR, DE, IT, ES) of long-term interest rates. 
Partial R² - Variance decomposition
13 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
  
Source Frequency Sample
Interest rates
Sovereign yields (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) ECB Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Corporate yield (Euro High Yield Index) FRED (BAML) Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Eurozone monetary policy 
EONIA ECB Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Securities held for monetary purpose (shmpp) ECB Monthly 2009M7 - 2017M3
International factors
Euro Effective exchange rate ECB Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Oil price FRED Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
US long-term sovereign yield FRED Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Eurozone Macroeconomic fundamentals
Industrial production (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) Eurostat Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Consumer price Index (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) Eurostat Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
Eurozone Current account (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) Eurostat Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M2
Eurozone Public debt (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) Eurostat Quarterly 2000Q1 - 2016Q4
Financial factors
VIX FRED Monthly 1999M1 - 2017M3
CISS (EZ, DE, FR, IT & ES) ECB Monthly 2000M9 - 2017M3
Expectations 
Eurozone 2-year ahead expected inflation ECB (SPF) Quarterly 1999Q1 - 2017Q1
Eurozone 2-year ahead expected GDP growth ECB (SPF) Quarterly 2000Q1 - 2017Q1
Table A - Data description
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EZ_s10y DE_s10y FR_s10y IT_s10y ES_s10y EZ_c10y
ϵSHMPP -0.165*** -0.061 -0.100*** -0.185*** -0.350*** 0.086
[0.03] [0.05] [0.02] [0.07] [0.04] [0.08]
ϵCISS_m 0.028 -0.027 0.256*** 0.16 0.346*** -0.064
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.12] [0.09] [0.21]
IPI_m -0.177*** -0.143*** -0.085*** -0.235*** -0.165*** -0.917***
[0.05] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.11]
CPI_m 0.282*** -0.092** 0.252*** 0.896*** 0.328*** 0.882***
[0.07] [0.04] [0.03] [0.11] [0.05] [0.13]
Debt_m 0.168*** 0.202*** -0.254*** 0.318*** 0.091* -1.220***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.12] [0.05] [0.12]
CA_m -0.298*** -0.045*** -0.028** 0.065 -0.070** 0.027
[0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.03] [0.27]
EER -0.007 -0.075*** 0.117*** -0.068* -0.137*** -0.401***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.07]
Oil 0.002 0.021 -0.039 -0.018 0.039* -0.001
[0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
VIX 0.182*** 0.121*** 0.028 0.251*** 0.207*** 0.863***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.06] [0.05] [0.08]
US_s10y 0.566*** 0.797*** 0.541*** 0.581*** 0.336*** 0.103
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.07] [0.06] [0.29]
SPF_CPI_2y 0.370*** 0.440*** 0.123*** 0.557*** 0.829*** 0.195*
[0.05] [0.06] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03] [0.11]
SPF_GDP_2y -0.118*** 0.018 -0.032** -0.142** -0.196*** -0.1
[0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.06] [0.06] [0.13]
constant 2.419*** 1.587*** 2.217*** 3.588*** 3.646*** 6.587***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.01] [0.05] [0.02] [0.09]
ARCH(1) 1.385*** 1.216*** 1.206*** 1.140* 1.846 1.202***
[0.40] [0.46] [0.30] [0.61] [1.69] [0.34]
constant 0.007* 0.005 0.004* 0.032 0.006 0.06
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04]
N 89 89 89 89 89 89
Table B - An ARCH representation of long-term interest rates
Main equation
Variance equation
Note : Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Each column corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) for a given market m (EZ, FR, DE, IT,
ES) of long-term interest rates. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EZ_s10y DE_s10y FR_s10y IT_s10y ES_s10y EZ_c10y
ϵSHMPP -0.270*** -0.142* -0.211*** -0.321*** -0.511*** -0.556**
[0.07] [0.08] [0.05] [0.09] [0.14] [0.27]
ϵCISS_m 0.276** -0.106 0.274*** 0.503*** 0.872*** 0.848**
[0.11] [0.18] [0.07] [0.13] [0.20] [0.36]
IPI_m -0.262*** -0.110 -0.089** -0.221*** -0.372*** -2.312***
[0.04] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.07] [0.27]
CPI_m 0.349*** 0.003 0.220*** 0.595*** 0.234* 0.770*
[0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.10] [0.12] [0.39]
Debt_m -0.215 -0.031 -0.833*** 0.053 0.211 -1.805***
[0.16] [0.19] [0.12] [0.21] [0.17] [0.67]
EER 0.107** 0.115*** 0.120*** 0.140*** 0.111 -0.368***
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.08] [0.13]
Oil -0.011 0.033 -0.02 -0.018 -0.023 -0.076
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10]
VIX 0.111*** 0.132** 0.092*** 0.105** 0.047 2.266***
[0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.21]
US_s10y 1.123*** 1.137*** 0.937*** 1.114*** 1.076*** 1.487***
[0.09] [0.12] [0.07] [0.09] [0.12] [0.48]
SPF_CPI_2y 0.376*** 0.373*** 0.236*** 0.368*** 0.738*** 0.172
[0.08] [0.07] [0.05] [0.09] [0.17] [0.31]
SPF_GDP_2y 0.380*** 0.223** 0.160** 0.254** 0.567*** 1.626***
[0.09] [0.11] [0.06] [0.11] [0.18] [0.42]
EONIA -0.052 0.000 0.042 0.045 -0.083 0.635**
[0.06] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.08] [0.31]
EONIA * ZLB -0.011 0.688** -0.100 -0.184 -0.112 -2.462***
[0.30] [0.28] [0.18] [0.39] [0.56] [0.81]
ZLB 1.663*** 0.007 1.872*** 2.519*** 2.560*** 8.025***
[0.37] [0.30] [0.21] [0.40] [0.53] [1.80]
constant 2.893*** 3.054*** 2.487*** 2.947*** 3.121*** 4.694***
[0.20] [0.19] [0.13] [0.22] [0.23] [0.94]
N 202 202 204 204 204 202
R² 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.85 0.92
Table C - Longer sample
Note : Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets. * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to the estimation of equation (4) for a
given market m  (EZ, FR, DE, IT, ES) of long-term interest rates. 
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Figure A – Time series of the main variables 
 
Sovereign yields (in %) 
 
 
Monthly change in SHMPP (in €Bn) and CISS (index) 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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